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behind its continued, separate existence.10 4 Wholly aside from the practical
interests of pressure groups, there is persuasive justification for the continued
preservation of special minimum wages on Government contracts. A govern-
ment definitely committed to a general policy of raising wages should require
the wages of laborers on its own contracts to reflect the objectives which it
seeks to promote. 1 5 The prevailing minimum wage is a device peculiarly
adapted to the attainment of this end, for it is flexible and yet projects a
minimum wage for a given industry which is closely related to actual minimum
wage conditions in that particular industry.
The general outline of future wage determinations may be sketched in
those which have already been made. Thus far the Public Contracts Division
can claim credit for a significant administrative achievement. To a tenuous
and unprecedented statutory formula it has given definition, content and a
reach of application which on the whole admirably combine the objective of
a fair minimum wage with the concrete dictates of wage conditions within the
several industries. The process of development has by no means reached its
end. Other industries will inevitably raise new problems. But the ruder lines
of demarcation have now been drawn, and the problem in the future will
be that of fitting within their confines the critical peculiarities of given in-
dustries.
OVER-THE-COUNTER TRADING AND THE MALONEY ACT*
I.
Fo'm the very beginning of Federal regulation of the distribution and trad-
ing of securities it has been recognized that adequate control of the national
security exchanges could not alone assure the protection of investors.' To have
left the over-the-counter markets out of a regulatory system would in large
measure have dissipated the benefits expected to accrue from regulation of or-
ganized exchanges. 2 Congress therefore provided in the Securities Exchange
164. The Walsh-Healey Act was backed strongly from the beginning by the American
Federation of Labor. See 80 CONG. REc. 10003 (1936) (telegram by William Green
to the members of the House Judiciary Committee). It has since also been favored by
the C.I.O. See N. Y. Times, July 24, 1938, p. 5, col. 4; July 28, 1938, p. 5, col. 6.
165. See Hearings before Subcommittee of House Commnittee on Judiciary on H. R.
11554, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), 222-223 (statement by the Secretary of Labor).
*This is the first of two comments on the proposed regulation of over-the-counter
markets. It attempts only to acquaint the reader with the nature and e.x'tent of the
problem to be solved. A detailed analysis of the mechanics of regulation and the prac-
tices to be controlled will appear in a later issue after more specific steps to malze the
Maloney Act operative have been taken by the Commission and the industry.
1. Address of William 0. Douglas, before the Bond Club of Hartford, S.E.C.
Release (Jan. 7, 1938) 1.
2. TwzxT= CENTURY FUND, ST0CK MNfA ' CONTROL (1934) 16.
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Act of 1934 that the Securities and Exchange Commission be granted powers
to adopt rules and regulations concerning the over-the-counter markets "neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest . ' . to insure investors protection
comparable to that provided by and under authority of this title in the case
of national securities exchanges." 3 The generality of this provision was un-
avoidable because of Congressional ignorance concerning the precise nature
and extent of the problems which were believed inherent in over-the-counter
markets.
4
The Maloney Act' is the result of some four years of research and study
by both the Commission and representatives of the over-the-counter industry.0
Preceded by a number of preliminary amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act which have paved the way for its introduction,7 the Maloney Act consists
of two basic provisions. First, it provides for the creation of voluntary self-
regulatory associations of investment bankers, brokers and dealers with powers
to adopt rules and regulations and to enforce them with effective economic
sanctions.8 Secondly, it grants to the Commission certain residuary powers
over the entire over-the-counter industry, whether connected with the volun-
tary associations or not.9 This program is based upon cooperative regulation
in which the burden will be largely borne by representative organizations of
firms and individuals within the industry, with the Government exercising
appropriate supervision and supplementary powers of direct regulation 1"
3. 48 STAT. 895, 15 U.S. C. § 78o (1934).
4. Address of Chester T. Lane, before Investment Bankers' Association of America
at San Francisco, California, S.E.C. Release (March 11, 1938) 5.
5. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o(c), 78o-3, 78q(a), 78cc(b), 78ff(c) (Supp,
1938). The Maloney Act actually consists of one new section and four amendments to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78a-78jj (1934).
6. See statement of Hon. Francis T. Maloney, Hearings before Cornndltee on
Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 6.
7. In 1936 the Commission recommended and Congress adopted a new Section 15.
In Section 15(a) it provided that no broker or dealer should use the mails or facilities
of interstate commerce unless he was registered with the S.E.C. Provision was made
in Section 15(b) for registration and the Commission was empowered to deny regis-
tration or revoke it for a few rather elementary causes. Section 15(c) forbade the
use of mails and interstate commerce facilities to any who might use them to effect any
transactions which under the Commission's rules were defined as manipulative, fraudulent
or deceptive. While Section 15(c) applied to all securities transactions, Section 15(a)
and (b) specifically exempted brokers and dealers devoting themselves exclusively to
the purchase and sale of municipal securities. 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), 15 U. S. C, § 780
(Supp. 1937).
8. Francis A. Bonner, speaking before the annual convention of the Investment
Bankers' Association of America said, "We must remember the vital fact that Congress
has done perhaps an unprecedented thing in removing restrictions of anti-trust laws
from this effort." S.E.C. Release (October 28, 1938) 5. He was referring to Section
1(i) (1) which provides that the rules of a registered association may require members
to deal with non-member brokers and dealers on the same basis as with the public as
far as fees, discounts and commissions are concerned.
9. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (Supp. 1938).
10. SEI. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 4.
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The business included within the scope of the new legislation is a far more
important part of our national economy than is generally realized." The
arbitrary statement that under the Securities Exchange Act the over-the-
counter markets consist of and include all transactions in securities which do
not take place on a national exchange gives but a vague picture of their true
character and function. An exchange, in theory, furnishes a public market
where buyers and sellers concentrate and where transactions are effected by
the meeting of the highest bid and the lowest offer under auction rules.12 Con-
trasted with this, the over-the-counter markets offer no such concentration
of traders. Rather they consist of an uncounted number of separate trans-
actions, private bargains where buyer and seller, or their respective agents,
deal directly with each other. No publicized record of transactions is kept;
no general information as to either volume or price in any given transaction
is available.13 Each firm participating in over-the-counter trading depends
upon independently acquired information as to what other firms in the busi-
ness are buying or selling, or are likely to buy or sell.14 The whole loose
structure is held together by a maze of telephone wires, personal relationships,
inter-firm correspondence and a number of private services which enable over-
the-counter houses to make their quotations available to one another. News-
paper quotations of the average bid and asked price of the more frequently
traded securities constitute the public's only readily available source of in-
formation in regard to over-the-counter prices.10
There are certain characteristics inherent in the informal over-the-counter
markets which make them the natural media for dealing in certain types of
securities.' 7 Of great importance is the fact that the primary operations of
the great underwriting houses take place in these unorganized markets.1 8 The
absence of publicity as to volume of trading enables these markets success-
11. TwEN=TT CENTuRY FUND, THE SECURITY M .xoErs (1935) 269.
12. S.E.C. REPORT ON THE SEGREGATION OF THE Fuxcrioxs OF DEALER AND Bnok=
(1936) 65.
13. Ibid.
14. TWENT=H CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS (1935) 265.
15. Id. at 266.
16. See Statement of James If. Landis, Hearings before Comnmittee on Banhing and
Currency on S. 4o23, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 12.
17. A dealer in this field has listed the characteristics of a security, any one or more
of which make it appropriate for over-the-counter trading, as follows:




5. Desirability for portfolios of insurance companies, investment trusts and
other similar institutional investors.
Meyer Willet, Over-thc-Counter Possibilities, Vall Street Journal, December 28,
1931, p. 4, col. 3.
18. Hearings before Committee onl Banking and Currency on S.3255, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 13.
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fully to handle large block buying or selling by institutional investors, whether
of unlisted or listed securities, without disrupting prices; a result which could
not be achieved if transactions of similar size were attempted upon an ex-
change. 19 High grade bonds, preferred stocks and guaranteed common stocks
with fixed returns, all securities with little speculative appeal, find their
medium of trading over-the-counter. 20 The securities of banks and insurance
companies, institutions whose public prestige could not survive the publicity
of speculative onslaughts were their issues bought and sold on an exchange,
are traded primarily over-the-counter.21 Securities of corporations which for
one reason or another are not listed on exchanges, whether because of small
capitalization, lack of national interest or the unwillingness of the corporation
to furnish information necessary for listing, must all go to the unorganized
markets.2 2 The obligations of the Federal Government, the states and munici-
palities are sold almost exclusively over-the-counter.2 3 And in addition to all
these, there are the individual transactions which seek the secrecy of the over-
the-counter markets to avoid some responsibility of the participants, such as
the duty of a director not to deal on an exchange in the securities of his
corporation when he has confidential information as to its corporate policy.-'"
While it is difficult to estimate the actual money value of securities handled
over-the-counter in any given period of time, it may safely be stated that in
the number of people engaged, in the volume of business done, and in the
number of investors directly affected, the over-the-counter markets substan-
tially exceed their more conspicuous relatives, the securities exchanges,25
Such are the nature and dimensions of that portion of the securities business
with which the Maloney Act concerns itself. The Act does not enlarge the
19. TwENTiETH CENTURY FUND, THaE SECURITY MARKETS (1935) 265.
20. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong,
3d Sess., (1938) 12.
21. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 4023, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 31, 32.
22. An exception to this statement may be found in the exchange trading of securities
on an unlisted basis. See pp. 641-644, infra. See generally, S.E.C. REPORT ON TRAoInG IN
UNLISTED SECURITIES UPON EXCHANGES (1936).
23. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 13.
24. An officer, director, or 10 per cent holder of equity securities in a corporation
whose securities are listed on an exchange must account to the corporation, within certain
limits, for his trading profits in the stock of that company. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C.
§ 78p (Supp. 1937). There is no such liability in the over-the-counter market. Hearings
before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 13,
25. While there are but 6,000 or so securities listed on exchanges, quotation services
subscribed to by over-the-counter firms list over 60,000. See S.E.C. Ruonr ON THE
SEGREGATION OF THE FuxcrIoNS OF DEALER AND BROKE (1936) 67. A comparison may
be found in the figures for insurance company securities during the summer of 1937, when
there were $343,000,000 of insurance company securities on exchanges as against some
$1,209,000,000 worth being traded over-the-counter. H. R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 3. See Address of Chester T. Lane before the Seattle Bond Club, SE.C.
Release (March 14, 1938) 2.
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objectives of the original Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act in which
Congress granted the Commission power to regulate the over-the-counter
markets.26 On the contrary, it represents an attempt to fill in and implement
the original outline in order to make possible the realization of the original
objectives.27 In its form the Maloney Act merely provides a legal background
for regulation. Until actual steps are taken to exercise the powers granted,
any comment upon this new legislation must of necessity be confined to a
discussion of the problems toward which such activity must be directed and
to a comparison of solutions now possible under the Maloney Act with pre-
vious attempts to regulate the over-the-counter business by the industry itself.
Ii.
The Maloney Act is intended to deal with those factors which prevent the
over-the-counter markets, in their present unorganized condition, from giving
the investing public the same uniformly fair treatment which the Commission
has by regulation made available upon the national securities exchanges.2
The most important problem in the relations of the over-the-counter markets
with the public is that involving the price at which a security may be bought
or sold. It is here necessary to differentiate between situations where the
investor is sold a worthless or fake security and those in which he is charged
more or given less for a bona fide security than its actual value or market
conditions warrant. Turning to the case of worthless securities, it is enough
to say that no self-regulatory body, even with legal powers to coerce and
punish, can hope to cope with the confirmed outlaw.20 That the problem of
protecting the public from the depredations of purveyors of fake securities
still exists is beyond question, but it can best be solved by means of criminal
prosecution by a governmental agency acting upon information obtained
through the cooperation of representative associations of the members of the
business.30
However, there exist a number of situations involving trading in bona fide
securities which also require rectification. Whether a customer has been
fairly treated in his transaction over-the-counter may be measured by two
consecutive standards. First, is the price which a customer pays, or gets,
for a given security a fair approximation of the current market available in
26. H. R. RYP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 4.
27. Id. at 5.
28. See Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S.3,$55, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 15.
29. "Just as long as there is a man willing to risk penitentiary walls, there will be
fellows trying that [selling fake securities]. They will never be governed by any asso-
ciation because they don't care about participation in underwritings that are decent."
Joseph C. Hostetler, Counsel for Investment Bankers Conference, Inc. Hcarings before
Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3z55, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 59.
30. See Address of David Sapperstein before the Eastern Group of the National
Association of Securities Commissioners, New York, S.E.C. Release (March 19, 1937) 6.
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that security? Second, assuming that the price quoted is as good as any that
could have been obtained, are there any manipulative factors affecting the
entire market which tend to raise or lower the general price level above or
below that which would be arrived at in free competitive trading?
With reference to the question of whether the customer gets the price to
which the current market entitles him, there are a number of practices in
the over-the-counter markets which have received the attention of the Com-
mission as inimical to public interest. Among such practices the following
may be numbered: the tendency of some firms to extract exorbitant profits
from their customers; high-pressure merchandising methods; the publication
or circulation of bid and asked prices or reports of transactions known to
be fictitious; the making of offers to buy or sell at a stated price with no
bona fide intent to effect transactions; the failure to make full and unequivocal
disclosure to a customer as to the capacity in which a broker-dealer is acting;
the subsidizing of competitors' employees; and the making of concealed profits
by collusion with other brokers and dealers.31
All but one of these practices, that of subsidizing competitors' employees,
are made possible and profitable to the unethical broker-dealer by the lack of
adequate price information generally available to the public. As has already
been stated, it is extremely difficult for a customer to discover what the
over-the-counter price of a security really is.3 2 He has no ticker service to
guide him, nor, unless he is constantly trading in a large volume of securities,
is he likely to be a subscriber to one of the services which list over-the-counter
prices.3 3 Even these are of little value, as they give no indication of buying
demand or selling pressure by figures of volume of trading.3 4 Being thus
left practically at the mercy of the honesty of the broker he chooses to deal
with, the customer runs into the further problem of discovering whether this
firm is going to act for him, on its own behalf, or for some third party.
The segregation of the functions of broker and dealer has been the subject
of much discussion in financial and governmental circles."5 In its report in
1936 upon the matter, the S.E.C. concluded that at that time too little was
known about the possible consequences of complete segregation in the over-
the-counter markets to warrant any definite conclusion. 36 Certain regulations
have, however, been promulgated which tend at least to make it possible for
the customer to know whether the house he is dealing with should be treated
31. Address of David Sapperstein before the National Security Traders Association,
Los Angeles, California, S.E.C. Release (August 4, 1936) 12, 13.
32. See note 16, supra.
33. The quotation sheets of the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. and TxuE SEcuIuTY
DF.ALERs OF NORTH AmERIcA are so voluminous that only the experienced trader would
know where and how to find any given price bid or asked.
34. TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECUaTY MARKETS (1935) 265.
35. See S.E.C. REPORT ON THE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNcTioNs OF DrALrER AND
BROKER (1936) XIII-XVIII.
36. Id. at 113.
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at arms' length or as a fiduciary.ar But the difficulty still remains, for even
though the customer knows that the firm he is dealing with is acting upon
its own account there is still little or nothing for him to do except take the
price quoted. It is too much to expect an ordinary customer to shop around
from firm to firm. Only the large investor, whether an individual or an insti-
tution, could possibly afford so to do.38
From the foregoing discussion it would appear that one of the needs of
the over-the-counter markets is a better and more public system of price
quotations designed to give the public some check upon the brokers and
dealers to whom it sells and from whom it buys. There are, however, several
obstacles to such a solution of this problem. In the first place, the very nature
of the unorganized markets makes the task of gathering adequate price data
with any reasonable speed extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible.
The great variety and quantity of securities traded and the fact that transac-
tions are consummated at no single place would necessitate an immense amount
of labor to report and tabulate prices as trading went on.39 To handle such
37. Neither a broker or dealer may effect any transaction for or with a customer
unless at or before the completi6n of the transaction he informs the customer in writing
whether he is acting as dealer for his own account, or broker for the customer or as
broker for some other person. General Rules and Regulations under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, to and including September 10, 1938, Rule X-Scl-4(1).
If he acts as broker for the customer, he is under a duty to disclose or offer to disclose
the name of the other party and the time of the transaction. He is further required to
reveal the amount of his commission or service fee and the amount paid ky him to
any sub-broker in the transaction. Id., Rule X-15cl4(2). If he is controlled by, or
controls, or is under common control with the issuer of a security involved in the trans-
action, that fact must be stated. Id., Rule X-1Scl-5. A broker or dealer who furnishes
investment advice for a consideration or has discretionary powers over a customer's
account may not effect any transaction in a security for or with his customer unless
he discloses any position, interest or option he may have in such security and obtains
written or telegraphic consent of the customer. Neither may such a broker or dealer
trade with his customer for an account in which he, or any principal for whom he is
acting is interested without similar consent of the customer. Id., Rules X-15cl-6,
X-15cl-7. All of the Rules here cited may be found in 135 C. C. H. 1938 Stock Exchange
Reg. Serv. 115309 C, D, E, F.
38. There are over 2,000 over-the-counter firms in New York City. Many firms
specialize in certain securities and some make considerable effort to provide a broad
and continuous market for their specialties. TWENTIM CENTuRy Fum.:, TIM SEcuMrr
MuLxTs (1935) 265. In a smaller community, it is more than likely that a transaction
will involve a number of telephone calls to brokers and dealers in other cities. Under
such circumstances the individual customer is precluded from seeing more than a few
firms at best, nor has he any way of knowing whether any of these is offering the best
price which the existing market warrants. TwmTImrH Cmrumm- Fnmz, Tn- SEcunIT-
MAARKs (1935) 267.
39. The magnitude of the undertaking can be itidged from the fact that there are
currently some 6,766 firms of brokers and dealers registered with the Commission as
transacting business in the over-the-counter markets. For purposes of comparison, there
are only 1,375 members of the New York Stock Exchange. Transactions in the over-
the-counter markets are consummated by word of mouth, over the telephone, by telegraph
19391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
a job would require a very large and skilled organization, the cost of which
might well be practically prohibitive. In the second place, if some such central
price bureau were achieved it would tend to destroy one of the most valu-
able characteristics of over-the-counter trading, its ability to absorb large
blocks of securities without disrupting price trends. It is this factor which
at present permits institutions and large private investors to buy and sell
with relative freedom from the depredations of speculators who, if they could
publicize a large liquidation, might easily create a wave of selling quite
unwarranted by the actual value of the security.40 The true answer seems
to lie not so much in the approximation of exchange quotations for over-the-
counter markets but rather in the enforcement of a standard of ethics among
brokers and dealers sufficiently high to warrant public reliance upon them
not to take advantage of their superior price knowledge under the present
system.4
1
The second problem in regard to over-the-counter prices involves their
artificial control by various methods of security price manipulation. While
it is not as easy to affect over-the-counter prices by some of the devices which
were used with such devastating success on exchanges prior to rigorous
regulation,42 there are, nevertheless, certain ways of obtaining the results
desired by unscrupulous speculators. Because of the scattered nature of over-
the-counter transactions, collusive agreements between brokers and dealers
to sell at certain prices can maintain an artificial price level for some time in
a particular locality before news of other and different prices of the same
security can break up the control thus obtained.43
It has been said that short selling as a manipulative device is confined to
the exchanges.44 While this statement is generally true in regard to a large
proportion of over-the-counter traders, it is a fact that a few firms with
access to a supply of the security in which they wish to operate can and do
indulge in short selling.45 It is known that security affiliates of bankers and
and by mail. To keep any useful check on the trend of transactions would require
constant contact with the myriad places where business is done. SEN. REP. No. 1455,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 2.
40. S.E.C. REPORT ON THE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONs OF DEALER AND BI0Eoi
(1936) 66, 67.
41. Address of William 0. Douglas before the Bond Club of Hartford, S, .C.
Release (January 7, 1938) 9.
42. See generally, Berle, Stock Market Manipulation (1938) 38 COL. L. RZv. 393;
Comment (1937) 46 YA.E L. J. 624. For a comprehensive classification of manipulative
activity upon exchanges, see TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SzcumTr MiAIXETMS
(1935) 444 et seq.
43. The Commission has said that "manipulative or deceptive practices in the com-
paratively unorganized markets are difficult to detect and prevent." S.E.C. REPOoT ON
T .ADNG IN UNLISTED SECURITIES ON EXCHANGES (1936) 18. See Kopald-Quinn & Co.
v. United States, now on appeal (C. C. A. 5th, Nov. Term, 1938) (no district court
opinion).
45. S.E.C. REPORT ON TRADING IN UNLISTED SECURITIES ON EXCHANGES (1936) 18,
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other large institutional investors have, in some instances, been able to borrow
stock for delivery against short sales with no difficulty whatever."0 Regula-
tion of this type of manipulative device is much more difficult in the unor-
ganized markets than on the exchanges. Such rules as have been promulgated
to control short selling on exchanges are entirely dependent upon the avail-
ability of a quoted market price.47 With this information, it is possible to
tell whether a short sale is intended merely to anticipate a general downward
trend or actually to encourage falling prices.48 In the over-the-counter mar-
kets, rules forbidding short selling at any price lower than the last sale could
not be enforced. In the first place, it is practically impossible for any one
trader to know what the "last sale" in any given security was; and second,
even if the "last sale" could be identified, a number of factors such as the
size of the block dealt in, or the difficulty of finding the security, might enter
into the price in one case whereas they might not apply in another.40 As a
result, short selling in the over-the-counter markets must be regulated, if at
all, by strictures entirely different from those suitable to govern exchange
trading.-0
Another manipulative device in the unorganized market has as its essential
element the presence of exchange trading in unlisted securities. The device
is simple enough. Buying or selling in volume upon an exchange is not at
present defined as a manipulative device although definite price changes may
result.5 1 Where there is a large amount of a security available over-the-
counter and a relatively small amount of the same security upon an exchange
on an unlisted basis, variations in price upon the exchange, achieved by per-
fectly legal means, can and do tend to set prices in parallel transactions over-
the-counter.52 This result is inevitable since, in comparison with the vague-
ness of over-the-counter quotations, the ticker price on an exchange seems
a very authoritative measure of value to the average investor.m It is thus
46. Ibid.
47. "No person shall, for his own account or for the account of any other person,
by the use of any facility of any national securities exchange effect a short sale of any
security at or below the price at which the last sale thereof, regular way,, was effected
on such exchange." Rule X-10A-I(a), under Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 135
C. C. K-. (1938) Stock Exchange Reg. Serv. i[2785B.
48. The fact that the ticker gives a complete record of the volume and price of
each transaction makes identification of selling orders to induce bearish tendencies in
the market relatively simple.
49. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency o: S.3,-55, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 57.
50. Regulation of this manipulative device might take the form of a requirement
that the short seller or his broker disclose the nature of his transaction either to the
commission or a registered association and thus make the fact available to the public.
51. See a discussion of this problem in Berle, Stoch Market fanipulaion (1938)
38 CoL L. REv. 393, 405.
52. See Comment (1938) 37 licn. L. REv. 98, 102.
53. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S.oa3, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 54.
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possible to control the price in a large volume of securities traded over-the-
counter by the trading of relatively small volumes upon an exchange. In this
manner speculators may achieve the objective of every manipulative device,
price control in the maximum amount of transactions in a given security with a
minimum outlay of capitalY4 As a result what would amount to a perfectly
legal and economically sound transaction were the security dealt in exclusively
upon an exchange or over-the-counter 5 turns out to be a manipulative device
when that security is simultaneously available on both types of securities
markets.
An obvious solution would be to forbid such duplication of markets for
any one security. As listed securities are not generally traded over-the-
counter,50 such a solution would point to termination of the privilege of
exchange trading of securities on an unlisted basisY7 The Commission haq
considered this possibility but concluded that so drastic a change would have
too disrupting an effect upon trading in these securities with a consequent
impairment of their value.5 s The Commission has recommended, and Congress
has adopted certain amendments to Section 12(f) of the Securities Exchange
Act which provide for the continuation of unlisted security trading upon
exchanges only upon given conditions. 9
Under these amendments, three types of unlisted exchange trading are
permitted. The first class includes those securities which were admitted to
unlisted trading prior to March 1, 1934.0 It is with respect to these securities
54. For a more specific analysis of the purposes of manipulation see TWnNTwLTIr
CENTURY FUND, THE SECURrY MARKETS (1935) 444, 445.
55. See note 51, supra. It is not altogether settled that mere buying in volume is
not per se manipulation when there is knowledge that prices will be affected, See
Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 624, 629.
56. In the bond markets large blocks of bonds that are listed on the exchanges are
normally dealt in over-the-counter. They seldom get on the exchanges at all. The blocks
that are dealt in on the exchanges might be called retail transactions. See statement
of George C. Mathews, Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. ;,'&5,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 12. But as high grade bonds have little speculative appeal
they do not enter to any degree into the problem of manipulation of over-the-counter
prices by exchange price control.
57. Listed securities, even if available simultaneously on exchanges and over-the-
counter, would ordinarily be traded in sufficient volume upon exchanges to make any
attempt at manipulation involve acts already prohibited. But the unlisted securities are
usually upon exchanges in substantially small volumes. Hearings before Committee n
Banking and Currency on S. 4023, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 91, 92. In Kopild-Quin
& Co. v. United States, now on appeal (C. C. A. 5th, Nov. Term, 1938) the device was
used with listed securities, but these were available in such limited volume as to malze
their situation analogous to the usual situation in unlisted securities.
58. See generally, S.E.C. REPORT ON TRADING IN UNLISTED SICURITIES ON Ex-
CHANGES (1936).
59. See notes 60, 65, infra.




that adequate information may not be available, and Congress therefore de-
termined that there should be no expansion in this category. The retirement
or redemption of securities, the reorganization or liquidation of issuers and
the transition of these securities to a fully listed status have effectively
diminished this group during the past four years as was anticipated. 60 The
second type of securities allowed unlisted trading privileges upon a given
exchange consists of those which are fully listed and registered upon some
other exchange.62 Permission to admit a security to exchange trading under
this provision is granted by the Commission only upon proof that such action
will be both advantageous to the exchange and beneficial to the public.0 3 The
third class accorded unlisted exchange trading privileges is comprised of
those securities whose issuers provide the Commission with periodic state-
ments, and other data containing information substantially equivalent to that
required for the registration and listing of a security on a national exchange."
Here also the standards of distribution, trading activity and public interest
must be satisfied before the Commission will permit tile unlisted exchange
trading privilege to be granted.05
The effect of exchange trading in unlisted securities upon the over-the-
counter markets still constitutes a problem which confronts both the Com-
mission and the industry. G The discretion allowed the Commission in grant-
ing or denying unlisted trading privileges will be exercised to prevent manipu-
lation of over-the-counter prices by this device, 7 but the Commission will
undoubtedly find it an extremely difficult task to determine when exchange
trading in an unlisted security might lend itself to this manipulative device
and when it will not.08 It is possible that only after the privilege has been
granted will the evil become apparent. Discovery at that late date will afford
small protection to the already victimized over-the-counter investor. The
closer supervision of the over-the-counter markets made possible under the
Mfaloney Act may enable the Commission in cooperation with registered asso-
ciations to adopt rules which will eliminate the possibility of this evil. Whether
61. Speech of David Sapperstein before Maine Investment Dealers Association,
S.E.C. Release (October 27, 1937) 7.
62. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 1375 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §781(f) (2)
(Supp. 1937).
63. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), as amended 49 ST.T. 1375 (1936), 15 U. S. C. §781(f)
(Supp. 1937).
64. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 1375 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 781(f) (3)
(Supp. 1937).
65. See note 63, supra.
66. For a list of the problems left unsolved by the 1936 amendments to section 12(f)
of the Securities Exchange Act see Hearings before Committee on Ban!inq and Cur-
rency on S. 4023, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 110-124.
67. Hearings before Committce on Banking and Currney on S. , 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 25.
68. See Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 40 3,74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 101.
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such rules will merely require the over-the-counter trader to disclose to his
customer the fact that unlisted exchange trading is based on a volume too
small to be a correct barometer of value, whether some scheme of price quota-
tion for over-the-counter securities will be devised that will supersede the
ticker price in authority in the public mind, or whether the association officials
with their intimate knowledge of the business will be able to ferret out the
combinations of over-the-counter men and exchange traders participating in
manipulation, remains to be seen. Certainly, with close cooperation between
government and the registered associations of brokers and dealers some better
solution can be devised than has heretofore been available.
III.
Voluntary attempts at self-regulation within the over-the-counter business
have usually taken the form of associations of firms having a common desire
to improve relations among themselves and with the public. The Investment
Bankers Association is the oldest, one of the largest and the most influential
of these organizations.69 Under the N.R.A. it lent its wealth of experience
to the promulgation of a code which controlled the activities of some 3,200
investment bankers, brokers and dealers.70 With the demise of the N.R.A.,
the Commission and the Investment Bankers' Association joined hands to
form the Investment Bankers Conference, Inc., and the latter's cooperation
has been invaluable in the Commission's development of the program culmin-
ating in the Maloney Act.
71
Among the brokers and dealers there have also been a number of attempts
to achieve self-regulation by means of voluntary associations. A pioneer group
in this field is the New York Security Dealers' Association. It was founded
for the purpose of safeguarding the public from the unscrupulous man in the
business and thus preserving public confidence in the members of the asso-
ciation.72 In spite of its laudable motives it has been unable to obtaitl a
membership of more than 75 of the 500 New York houses eligible tinder
its rules.73 But the California Security Dealers Association met with more
success. At present it has a membership of 166 out of some 300 eligible state
brokers and dealers. 74 The association encourages members to maintain a
69. The Investment Bankers Association of America was founded in 1912. Its pres-
ent membership of about 790 is exceeded only by that of the Investment Bankers Con-
ference, Inc., founded in 1936 through the efforts of the I. B. A. and the Commission,
Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency S. 3z55, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938) 64.
70. Hearings before a Subconmnittec of Committee on Interstate and Foreiqn Com-
merce on H. R. 9634, S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 20.
71. H. R. R. Por No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 5, 6.
72. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3z55, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 40, 41.
73. Ibid.
74. CommunicatiOn from California Commissioner of Corporations, E. M. Dougherty,
to the YALE LAW JOURrAL, Dec. 17, 1938.
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reasonable degree of financial responsibility " and its constitution states that
it is formed to promote high standards of commercial honor and integrity
and in every way to gain public confidence for the investment business.7
It has also adopted and attempts to the best of its ability to enforce rules
of fair practice which have had a definite effect in improving the standards
of the business in California.
7
Commendable as such efforts at self-regulation may be,78 it remains a fact
that these associations cannot by themselves achieve the high standards of
conduct which the Commission, the public and the progressive members of
the over-the-counter business consider essential.70 Effective .action is pre-
vented by a number of factors. In the first place, there are no sanctions for
the enforcement of association regulations. Expulsion from membership can
mean no more than a loss of a certain amount of good will since any attempt
to discriminate economically against non-members might, in the absence of
legislative permission, amount to a violation of state or federal anti-trust
laws.80 Secondly, the association cannot undertake any comprehensive mea-
sures to give its members efficient price data since such efforts might well
result in violations of existing law.8 ' With these handicaps it is difficult to
overcome the natural antipathy of brokers and dealers toward a program
entailing expense and regulation. As a consequence, the small proportion of
75. Unpublished memorandum by California Commissioner of Corporations, E. M.
Dougherty, on History of Self Regulation in Califonia for Security Dcalers (Esent to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 17, 1938) 2.
76. Articles of Incorporation of California Security Dealers Association, Article II,
subsection (b).
77. Communication from California Commissioner of Corporations, E. M. Dough-
erty, to the YALE LAW JoURxAL, Dec. 17, 1938.
78. There are, in all, some 23 associations now in existence te purpose of w hich
is to improve conditions in the over-the-counter markets. Communication from Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to the YALE LAW JotURN ., Dec. 16, 1938.
79. See Address of William 0. Douglas before the Bond Club of Hartford, S. E. C.
Release (January 7, 1938) 4, 5.
80. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Comm., 13 F. (2d) 673,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (rules requiring members of grain exchange to deal .ith non-mem-
bers on discriminatory basis held unfair competition and tending to monopoly).
81. It is now clearly established that an exchange may send quotations to such per-
sons as it sees fit and no others, such quotations being the property of the exchange.
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926). But in thmt case the quo-
tations Were from transactions on the exchange floor. Id., at 605. In the over-the-counter
markets quotations could be gathered only from transactions at the various bro!:ers'
offices. The Commissioner of Corporations states that the California Security Dealers
Association has been advised by counsel that going too far in the direction of giving
quotations to association members might incur serious liability. Communication to the
YALE LAW JouRNAL, Dec. 17, 1936. At any rate it remains a fact that associations have
been hesitant to undertake any but the most general price quotation services. Since early
in 1938, the Investment Bankers Conference, Inc., has collected and disseminated average
daily quotations. This service was previously done by the New York Security Dealers
Ass'n.
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over-the-counter firms now belonging to associations makes those organiza-
tions a relatively ineffective control over the industry. 2
The Maloney Act successfully puts teeth into associative action."3 Now
the over-the-counter men have two choices, either to join a registered asso-
ciation and get some voice as to what rules shall govern them, or stay out
and be regulated by the Commission. Non-members must bear the burden
of being denied brokers' discounts by association firms.8 4 With these factors
to give incentive to association membership plus the power of such an asso-
ciation not only to suggest rules but also to enforce them with real economic
sanctions, self-regulation becomes a practical reality.sa The Maloney Act
supplies exactly what voluntary self-regulatory attempts have heretofore
lacked, power within the business itself to enforce rules and regulations re-
quiring conduct higher in standard than even that which the government
could effectively require by law.80
IV.
Regulation under the Maloney Act is to be achieved through the combined
efforts of associations within the industry and of the Commission. The
status of "registered association" is to be granted any group of over-the-
counter firms which meets certain specified qualifications."8 Among these
are the requirements that the association be either nation-wide in scope or
representative of some economically cohesive region;"" that membership be
open to all brokers and dealers who carry on an honest business, exclusion
being subject to such rules as the Commission may approve ;10 and further,
that the general pattern of organization be such as to satisfy the Commission
that the association seeking to be registered will be able to discharge its
function of carrying out the purposes of the Maloney Act.0 '
Non-membership in a registered association will not preclude a broker or
dealer from use of the mails or interstate commerce facilities, 0 2 nor does
82. See Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency, S. 3255. 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 67.
83. See Speech of Francis A. Bonner before annual convention of Investment Banmh-
ers Association, S. E. C. Release (October 28, 1938) 5; Address of Robert E. -Iealy
before New York Security Dealers' Association, S. E. C. Release (March 10, 1938) 8,
84. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3(c) (1) (Supp. 1938). The prohibitions of the
anti-trust laws in regard to discrimination against non-members are specifically removed.
52 STAT. 1075, 15 U.S. C. § 78o-3(n) (Supp. 1938).
85. See note 84, supra.
86. The practical impossibility of the Commission attempting to police the entire
over-the-counter industry was pointed out by Commissioner George C. Mathews to the
Senate Committee. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 8.
87. H. R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 4.
88. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 (a) (b) (Supp. 1938).
89. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3(b) (3) (Supp. 1938).
90. Ibid.
91. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3(b) (7) (Supp. 1938).
92. H. R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 6.
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membership in a registered association obviate the requirement that he in-
dividually must register with the Commission. 3 Associations are granted
the power to enforce their rules and regulations by expulsion of violators,ol
and to require members to do business with any broker or dealer who is not
a member of any registered association only at the same prices, commissions
and fees as are accorded the general publicP. This economic sanction 0 will
undoubtedly encourage membership in the registered associations, since it
makes exclusion or non-membership analogous to the loss of a seat upon
a national exchange.
9 7
The Commission's supervisory power over the registered association in-
cludes the authority to review any cases of exclusion or expulsion from
membership 9s and to supplement association rules in regard to four speci-
fied classes of subject matter: (1) rules as to the eligibility and discipline
of members; (2) the method for adopting or changing rules of the associa-
tion; (3) the method of choosing officers and directors; and (4) affiliations
between registered associations.99 The Commission may also remove any
officer or director of an association who wilfully abuses his duty or fails
to enforce association rules,100 and may expel any member of an association
who violates, or does business with anyone who to his knowledge, actual or
constructive, is violating, any association or Commission rule as to methods
and manner of conducting business.' 0 '
Section 2 of the Maloney Act provides for the Commission's control of
the whole over-the-counter industry including members and non-members of
registered associations. 10 2 Authority is granted the Commission to pass rules
and regulations forbidding the use of mails and interstate commerce facilities
to effect over-the-counter transactions which are manipulative, deceptive or
fraudulent.10 3 Unlike the rest of the Maloney Act, this provision applies to
dealers in municipal and Federal obligations.104 Another subsection empowers
93. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 (a) (2) (Supp. 1938).
94. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. §78o-3(b)(9) (Supp. 1938).
95. See note 84, supra.
96. Without this enabling provision in the Act such a rule might amount to a viola-
tion of the anti-trust laws. See notes 80, 81. supra.
97. See address of Robert E. Healy before New York Security Dealers' Assetia-
tion, S. E. C. Release (farch 10, 1938) 3.
98. 52 ST.T. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 (g) (Supp. 1938).
99. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C § 78o-3(k) (Supp. 1938).
100. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3(1) (3) (Supp. 1938).
101. 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S. C. §78o-3(1)(2) (Supp. 1938).
102. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S.
C. § 78o(c) (1) (2) (3) (Supp. 1938).
103. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), as amended 49 ST.T. 1377 (1936), 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S.
C. § 78o(c) (1) (Supp. 1938).
104. The original 'Maloney Bill expected to include brokers and dealers who hanlled
municipal bonds exclusively along with the rest of the over-the-counter industry. Hear-
ings before Committee on Bankinq and Currency on S. 325, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)
1-6. But after vigorous objections by many municipal dea!ers and municipalities the
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the Commission to pass rules and regulations intended to prevent fraudulent,
manipulative and deceptive devices and fictitious quotations;105 and a final
grant allows the Commission to forbid the use of mails and interstate com-
merce by brokers and dealers who contravene "such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the public interest or for
the protection of investors to provide safeguards with respect to the financial
responsibility of brokers and dealers."' 0 6
The remaining sections of the Maloney Act are included merely to align
the new legislation with the existing Securities Exchange Act. Section 3
amends subsection (b) of Section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act so that
contracts entered into in violation of regulations regarding financial responsi-
bility shall not be void, and that actions to rescind contracts made contrary
to other Commission regulations must be brought within a stated period.10,
Section 4 of the Maloney Act excludes violations of Commission rules in
regard to financial responsibility from the operation of Section 32 of the
Securities Exchange Act except where the violation involves false or mis-
leading statements in reports required by the Commission. 0"
V.
At the present time, conferences between the Commission and the over-
the-counter industry have not yet produced any definite plan for organizing
the over-the-counter markets into a scheme conforming with the purposes
and objectives of the Maloney Act.1 9 There are several factors, however,
operation of the act was limited to securities designated as non-exempt under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. See 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(m) (Supp. 1938). As to the
wisdom or necessity of this exemption see Address of Robert E. Healy before the New
York Security Dealers' Association, S. E. C. Release (farch 10, 1938) 6. Compare
Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1933) 106, 107.
In the Maloney Act as finally passed, only Section 15(c) (1) of the Securities Exchange
Act is made applicable to transactions in municipal, state and Federal securities.
105. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S.
C. § 78o(c) (2) (Supp. 1938).
106. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), as amended 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), 52 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S.
C. § 78o(c) (3) (Supp. 1938).
107. 48 STAT. 903 (1934), as amended 52 STAT. 1076, 15 U. S. C. § 78cc.(b) (Supp.
1938).
108. Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act provides fines and penalties for viola-
tions of rules and regulations set forth under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48
STAT. 904 (1934), as amended 52 STAT. 1076, 15 U. S. C. § 78ff.
109. A joint committee representing the Investment Bankers Association and the
Investment Bankers Conference has recently recommended that the Investment Bankers
Conference modify its present set-up so as to comply with the Maloney Act and allow it
to register under the name of Securities Dealers Association. This group has 1553 mem-
bers and is nation-wide in character and would undoubtedly constitute the largest single
association to come under the Act. A drafting committee is now at work on the charter
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which will undoubtedly be considered in the formation of a program, what-
ever its exact nature may be.
There can be no doubt that the Commission will insist upon some form
of regional autonomy in the over-the-counter business. Spokesmen for the
Commission have repeatedly emphasized its desire to establish financial self-
sufficiency within the several geographic and economic regions into which
the Commission considers the United States capable of division.11 0 Regional
representation in the registered association set-up contemplated in the
Maloney Act could be achieved by any one of three possible devices. First,
there could be a number of registered associations, each representing an
economically cohesive region; second, there could be one nation-wide regis-
tered association with a number of affiliated registered associations; and
third, there could be one nation-wide association with provisions for regional
representation within its own constitution and by-laws."'
For a period of years preceding the Maloney Act, over-the-counter men
have criticized the Commission for apparently encouraging and favoring the
exchanges at the expense of the unorganized markets.'1- That the high
standards now enforced by the Commission upon the exchanges have raised
their prestige before the public is undoubtedly true, and it is equally correct
that with this new confidence, exchanges have pressed to widen the scope
of their trading in both listed and unlisted departments.3l The action of the
Commission in turning to the exchanges first was not prompted by any intent
to destroy the importance of the over-the-counter markets.114 It was a
matter of expediency. The problems of the exchanges were known, and close
organization made an immediate attack in that direction possible. With the
over-the-counter markets action had to be delayed until adequate data upon
which to proceed could be obtained., 5
The Maloney Act grants the over-the-counter industry an opportunity to
raise its own standing with the public to the level already attained by the
and by-laws of the proposed association. Communication from Wallace Fulton, Director
of Investment Bankers Conference, Inc., to the YALE L., JoL-EAL, January 10, 1939.
The Securities and Exchange Commission e.-pects to submit the results of this worl:
to the trade for consideration in the near future. Communication from Henry H. Egly
to the YALE LAW Jou.NAL, January 10, 1939.
110. See Address of William 0. Douglas under auspices of San Francisco Stocl: Ex-
change, S. E. C. Release (June 17, 1938) 4-10.
111. See public letter of AV. 0. Douglas to J. F. Brown of Denver, Colorado, S. E. C.
Release (October 26, 1938).
112. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 4o.?s, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 48-75, 82-99.
113. See Speech of Henry H. Egly before Investment Bankers Association, S. E. C.
Release (Dec. 7, 1938) 3.
114. See public letter of William 0. Douglas to W. H. Fulton, Director of Invest-
ment Bankers Conference, S. E. C. Release (July 19, 1938).
115. See Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3z55, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 14.
19391
